Party Autonomy and Two-Party Electoral Competition by Cain, Bruce E.
POINT / COUNTERPOINT
PARTY AUTONOMY AND TWO-PARTY1
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
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There is widespread sympathy these days for giving U.S. voters
much more freedom and choice in making their selections. Some see
choosing between only two parties as the political equivalent of not
having cable television-excusable in the fifties, but not in the
modem era. Even the increasingly prevalent use of the term
"duopoly" for a two-party system has a pejorative implication of
unnatural constraint.' The term "competition" in U.S. politics has
traditionally meant only that the voter has more than just one viable
candidate, party, or option to choose from.2 Now, however, there are
new claims to be assessed: that two parties are not sufficient given the
complexities of modem society,3 and, more to the point of this Article,
t Robson Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of
Gox rnmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley.
Consider, for example, the use of the term "duopoly" in the titles of two recent
law journal articles that are critical of the power that major parties have to entrench
themselves: Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not
Allow th States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUp.
Ci. REv. 331, and Daniel R. Ortiz, Duopoly Versus Autonomy: How the Two-Party System
Harms the Major Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 753 (2000).
I concur with Richard Hasen's comments on the partisan lockup model:
",lthough two parties are better than one, it is not so clear that three are better than
two, or even that two parties being influenced by third parties are better than two
parties not so influenced." Richard L. Hasen, The "Political Market" Metaphor and
Elortion Law: A Comment on Issacharoff and Pildes, 50 STAN. L. REV. 719, 726 (1998).
There is no theoretical framework that allows one to assert with confidence that
proportional representation is more competitive than winner-take-all systems. A review
of the political science literature on congressional elections illustrates that the central
issue of competition is the problem of uncontested and incumbent-dominated seats,
and not the lack of third-party threats. See GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLTICS OF
CONGRESSIONNL ELECTIONS 45-46 (2d ed. 1987) (noting that the incumbency factor
can discharge opposition since "[m]any incumbents win easily by wide margins
because the), face inexperienced, sometimes reluctant challengers who lack the
financial and organizational backing to mount a serious campaign for Congress").
_ For an example of the strong advocacy of multipartyism, see DOUGLAS J. ANfY,
REL CHOICEs/NEw VOICES: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
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that voters should be free to participate in several party primaries
simultaneously.4 The desire to have more choices has been amplified,
and perhaps distorted, in recent years by the popularity of economic
modes of analysis that suggest many parallels between markets and
elections.5 As highly competitive markets with numerous small firms
tend to spur product innovation and lower prices, then perhaps giving
voters more choices will result in better representation. But is it
always true that offering voters more choices is necessarily better?
For those who would answer yes to the previous question, the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in California Democratic Party v.
Jones,6 striking down California's blanket primary system, and in
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,7 defending a ban on fusion
candidates in support of a two-party system, erect new judicial barriers
to a better democracy. Instead of promoting more choice, these
decisions seem to some to restrict voter choices and weaken the
prospect of minor party challenges. I argue against the prevailing
assumption that more choices necessarily result in better democracy.
Democratic theory recognizes numerous forms of legitimate party
systems and electoral rules, and gives us no basis to conclude that
multiparty systems are more democratic than two-party systems, or
that closed party nomination rules are less democratic than open or
blanket systems that offer voters more choices. All conform to the
basic requirements of a democracy as laid out by Joseph Shumpeter,
Robert Dahl, Anthony Downs, and other modern theorists.' Looking
ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1993). Amy even goes so far as to call the two-party
system a "monopoly." Id. at 7.
4 So far this position has found support with such political scientists as Elizabeth
Gerber and Jonathon Nagler who testified at the Jones trial, and from legal scholars
such as Richard L. Hasen, Do the Parties or the People Own the Electoral Process ?, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 815, 817 (2001), Daniel R. Ortiz, supra note 1, at 766-74, and Samuel
Issacharoff, Private Parties With Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms and
Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
5 The strongest statement in favor of this approach is in Samuel Issacharoff &
Richard H. Pildes's article, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process,
50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 647-48 (1998) (arguing for a shift in public law thought similar
to the shift in corporate law scholarship-towards markets for partisan control).
6 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000) (holding that California's blanket primary violated
political parties' associational rights).
520 U.S. 351 (1997) (holding that Minnesota's fusion ban does not violate the
First and Fourteenth Amendments).
8 See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3 (1956) (arguing that
"democratic theory is concerned with processes by which ordinary citizens exert a
relatively high degree of control over leaders"); ANTHONY DoWNs, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 20 (1957) (using economic models to show that "democratic
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at the effects of implementing a blanket system, there is no
compelling state reason for forcing parties to adopt such rules when
they would quite understandably prefer not to. Moreover, I argue
that letting the parties decide how to bestow their party labels with
only minimal constitutional constraint serves important functional
purposes in a two-party democracy. It also saves the Court from being
a party to yet another, unnecessary lock-in of one particular
representational theory (i.e., hypercentrism).
There are two basic questions raised in California Democratic Party
ZY. Jones. The first, largely a political science question, concerns the
relative merits of different nomination systems and whether it can be
said indisputably that a blanket primary is better than a closed
primary. I will argue that it cannot. The second question is whether
the state should be allowed to impose a nomination system upon the
parties. Based on a principle of functional party autonomy, I will
argue that the answer is no.' While V.0. Key's work usefully reminds
us that party ties can also be found between elected representatives
and the general electorate,' the central question in Jones concerns the
party organization's right to establish the process and criteria by
which it officially confers its party label upon candidates on the
November ballot. Whether a significant number of party registrants
and some elected officials might have favored the state's action is not
relevant since the question at issue concerns the official party
organization.
In the sections that follow, I will first set out evidence concerning
the relative merits of different primary nomination systems. Much of
this is derived from recent political science work in this area,
especially a recent study of California's only election under the
blanket primary system." Secondly, I will consider the case for the
Court's intervention based on a functional theory of party autonomy. 2
goxernments act rationally to maximize political support"); JOSEPH A. SCHUM PETER,
C, PITALISM. SOCLALISM AND DEMOClRACky 269 (3d ed. 1950) (describing democracy in
economic terms and as a "competition for political leadership").
" The term "party" in this discussion refers to the official party organization.
D S, V.O. KEA, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 163-65 (5th ed.
1964) (contending that party affiliation within the body of voters as a whole has a
"social reality").
A SeeVOTINGAT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE: CALiFORNIA'S EXPERIMENT WI-H THE
BLvNKET PRIIALRY (Bruce E. Cain & Elisabeth R. Gerber eds., forthcoming 2001)
[hereinafter VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE] (exploring the impact and
outcome of California's blanket primary election on political parties and the election
process).
I Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A
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Unlike the position taken by the Brennan Center for Justice in the
Jones litigation and by Rick Hasen in this volume, this theory does not
distinguish between major and minor parties and does not hold that
minority parties deserve different or greater protections than major
parties themselves. I argue that the function and value of protecting
minority voices (such as activists and party supporters with noncentrist
positions) within the major parties is as valuable as protecting the
minor parties. Finally, I will consider the question of how to reconcile
the Court's intervention with my general aversion to judicial
interference with the political sector. I argue that in Jones, the Court
acted to prevent the state from the unnecessary lock-in by initiative of
a particular theory of competition (i.e., hypercentrism). In other
areas, such as redistricting, I have opposed the Court's attempt to
define criteria of fairness that would lock in rigid and highly
disputable theories of representation.
I. THE BLANKET PRIMARY CONSIDERED
The basic political science question at the core of the Jones case is
whether the blanket primary system enacted by Proposition 198
imparts any important, let alone compelling, state interest on
California's electoral system. This divides into an empirical
assessment-what are the actual effects of implementing a blanket
system?-and a normative/legal assessment-to what degree are the
measurable effects important for a democratic state and how do the),
fit into a sensible scheme of legal regulation? At the Jones trial and in
subsequent studies of the blanket primary's impact in the one
California election before the Court overturned Proposition 198,
political scientists examined many different possible effects, such as
the blanket primary's impact on campaign spending levels and
incumbency reelection rates. Some of these causal relationships are
valuable in assessing the pure policy problem of predicting what
might happen when blanket rules are put in place, but do not address
core state interests. The primary goal of imposing the blanket system
was not to lower campaign costs or incumbency reelection rates.
Indeed, there is evidence that some of these effects went the other
direction; for example, incumbents were rewarded with even more
Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 775 (2000) (describing file
paradigms that compete forjudicial attention in cases dealing with political parties and
thejudiciary's regulation of party nomination processes and ballot access restrictions).
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support under the blanket system.'3 In general, the ancillary empirical
findings serve to remind us that any set of rules has both good and
bad unintended effects.
The two potential state interests I want to focus on are higher
participation and ideological moderation.14  With respect to the
former, it is clearly important for a democracy to have extensive
participation by its citizens for several reasons. First, it prevents
skewed or biased outcomes that may occur when key segments of the
electorate are not active participants. Unless the portion of those who
actually vote is representative of the entire population as a whole,
election outcomes can get skewed.'5 In that case, a process that yields
biased decisions can lose legitimacy in the eyes of citizens who feel
shut out. Finally, since participation is partly educative-i.e., people
inform themselves in order to make their choices-getting people to
participate raises awareness and knowledge of the pertinent election
issues. So if there is a strong and narrowly tailored link between the
blanket system and wider participation, the state might plausibly have
an important reason for imposing the blanket system upon the
parties.
But is it true? A blanket primary system is defined as one that
allows voters the freedom to vote in any party election he or she
chooses for each race. Thus, a voter can vote in the Republican
primary for the president, the Democratic primary for state senator,
.Site Anthony M. Salvanto & Martin P. Wattenberg, Peeking Under the Blanket: A
Diert Look at Crossover Voting in the 1998 Primay, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT
LINE, snpra note 11 (manuscript at 184, 200-01) (hypothesizing why incumbents have
more support under blanket primary systems).
A The majority opinion in Jones reviewed seven alleged state interests and found
that many of them were restatements of one another or were othenvise not
compelling. Myjudgment that participation and moderation are plausible candidates
is based on the real empirical effects of rule changes on voter behavior rather than the
%ague, largely rhetorical claims of the defendants.
1' The argument for adverse effects on the poorest segments of the population is
made in FrVNCES Fox PIVEN & RICI-LHAD A. CLOWARD, WI AMERICANS DON'T VOTE
103-12 (1988) (noting the historical trend that the majority of those not registered to
vote have low incomes, which has historically skewed politics away from poorer
constituencies). The dissenting view can be found in RAM ION"D E. WOLFINGER &
STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 13-36 (1980) (examining the effects of
socioeconomic status on voter turnout while concluding that income does not have a
strong, independent effect on turnout). An even more skeptical viewpoint argues that
U.S. voting does not differentially suppress turnout among people ith low and high
lei els of education. SeeJonathan Nagler, The Effect of Registration Laws and Education on
US. 1otr Turnout, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1393, 1393 (1991) (concluding "that
restrictive registration laws do not dissuade individuals with lower levels of education
any more than individuals with higher levels of education").
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and so forth. Since there is no restriction by party affiliation,
independents and party registrants can freely enter any party's race.
In a closed primary, only those who are registered with the party
(typically some specified number of days in advance of the election)
can vote in that party's primary. Independents and other party
registrants are not allowed to participate unless they affiliate with that
party prior to the election. In an open primary system, there is no
prior party registration requirement, but the voter is allowed to take
only one party ballot and may not cross party lines for different races.
Finally, in the semi-open systems, independents are allowed to cross
party lines, but no other party registrants are allowed to do so.
The expectation that the blanket primary system might increase
participation is based on the understanding that, at a minimum,
independents would be able to vote in contests from which they were
previously excluded, as well as the belief that some party registrants
might become more energized by the opportunity to participate in
another party's primary. The 1998 California primary provided a
natural experiment for these predictions. With the blanket rules in
effect, the turnout proved to be 29.8% of the eligible vote.
Comparing this with the three previous non-presidential California
primaries beginning with 1986, the 1998 figure represents an increase
of 2.4% over the closed primary average of 27.4%. As Wendy K. Tam
Cho and Brian Gaines demonstrate, assuming a constant turnout rate
among partisans and nonpartisans, the surge can be completely
explained by the addition of the nonpartisan registrants.'6 They
conclude that there is no obvious sign in the aggregate data that the
blanket primary energized party registrants or that the surge carried
over into the general election in November.
In sum, the effect of the blanket primary system is very modest in
size and restricted to the primary election only. Furthermore, the
effect comes about mainly for the purely mechanical reason that
independents were given the right to vote in partisan primaries
without having to bother to register with a party. The significance of
this last point is that the state could have essentially achieved the same
modest increase in a less-burdensome manner by simply allowing
independents to vote in partisan primaries. Allowing Democrats to
vote in Republican contests and vice versa contributed little to the
16 See Wendy Y. Tam Cho & Brian J. Gaines, Candidates, Donors, and Voters in
California's First Blanket Primay Elections, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE, suipra
note 11 (manuscript at 249, 255-57) (arguing that the blanket primary system did not
significantly increase crossover participation between the parties).
2001] PARTY AUTONOMY AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION 799
participation goal. But even more importantly, there are more
narrowly tailored ways to dramatically increase participation-such as
Sunday voting, compulsory voting, combining automatic voter
registration with the application for a motor vehicle license-that
California and other states have not seen fit to implement.17  How
compelling can this interest in participation be if states choose to
ignore the measures that would clearly improve general turnout
dramatically in favor of a measure which modestly affects the primary
election only? Moreover, the assumption that primary turnout needs
to be increased only makes sense if one assumes that we are trying to
set up a two-step general election process. But this is precisely the
question at issue: should the primary be thought of as another
general election or as a way for the parties to nominate their
candidates? If one takes the latter view, then turnout is an internal
issue for the parties to resolve, not a state interest.
The second possible interest that a state might have in imposing a
blanket system upon the political parties is to strengthen their
incentives to nominate more moderate candidates. Although no one
at the Jones trial or in subsequent studies has produced evidence that
candidate extremism has become a major problem in California, the
story of how Proposition 198 got onto the ballots suggests what its
authors might have had in mind. In 1992, a moderate Republican
candidate, Tom Campbell, lost to a conservative Republican
candidate, Bruce Herschenson, who then went on to lose to a liberal
Democrat, Barbara Boxer, in the general election. Campbell and
other moderates believed that he would have beaten Boxer in the
November contest had the closed nature of the Republican primary
process not precluded a moderate winning the nomination. Fearing
that the party would remain captured by the conservative and
Christian right elements as long as they were protected by closed party
rules, Campbell, with Silicon Valley support, set out to rescue the
Republican Party by changing its rules to allow independents and
17 Se G. Bingham Powell, Jr., American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, 80
AM. POL. SCI. REv. 17 (1986) (providing an empirical comparison of U.S. voter
turnout and the turnout rates of other democratic nations).
I. See Nathaniel Persily, The Legal Regulation of Party Nomination Methods:
Califi rnda Democratic Party v. Jones, John McCain, and Beyond, Paper Delivered at the
American Political Science Meetings (Aug. 31-Sept. 3, 2000) (arguing for more judicial
protection for party organizational autonomy by contending that voter turnout should
be a party preoccupation and not a state concern), available at
http://pro.han-ard.edu/paper/034/034013PersilyNat.pdf.
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crossover Democrats to vote in the Republican primary.7 ' In short, it
would be fair to characterize Proposition 198 as an attempt by one
faction of the Republican Party to use state law to gain advantage over
another faction.
The assumption that crossover voters would help moderate
candidates is supported by several academic studies. Comparing the
ADA scores of members of Congress elected under different primary
systems, Elisabeth Gerber and Rebecca Morton show that candidates
elected under open, blanket, and nonpartisan primaries are more
moderate than otherwise similar candidates elected from closed
primaries." Other studies show that open primary states produce a
higher proportion of mixed-party Senate and House delegations."1
Looking at the experience in California, Gerber finds that moderates
won fifty percent of all state assembly primary contests in 1998 under
the blanket primary rules as compared to thirty-seven percent in 1996
under closed primary rules.22
Given that the empirical relationship seems to be measurable, the
question is whether it is in a state's interest to have more centrist
candidates. Leaving aside for the moment the associational harm
inflicted on the parties by having nominations determined by
nonparty members, there is no obvious need to produce more
centrism at the pre-general-election phase of the process. Two-party
systems with single-member, winner-take-all rules already have very• - 23
strong median voter incentives. Parties correct themselves from
being too extreme by learning over time that moving to the center is a
dominant strategy. Bill Clinton's new Democratic policies in 1992
19 See Brian J. Gaines & Wendy t. Tam Cho, Crossover Voting Before the Blanket:
Primaries versus Parties in California History, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE,
supra note 11 (manuscript at 14, 41-43); see also, e.g., Dave Lesher, State's Radical Shft to
an Oen Primary Upheld, LA- T IES, Nov. 18, 1997, at Al.
See Elisabeth R. Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems and
Representation, 14J.L. ECON. & ORG. 304, 318-22 (1998) (concluding that participation
by more of the electorate in open voting systems leads to the election of more
moderate candidates).
21 See Bernard Grofman & Thomas L. Brunell, Explaining the Ideological Differences
Between Two Senators Elected From the Same State: An Institutional Effects Model in
CONGRESSIONAL PRIMARIES IN THE POLITIs OF REPRESENTATION (Peter F. Galderisi ed.
forthcoming 2001).
2 See Elisabeth R. Gerber, Strategic Voting and Candidate Policy Positions, in VOTING
AT THE POLITIcAL FAULT LINE, supra note 11 (manuscript at 291, 309-12) (analyzing
the moderation effect of blanket primaries).
23 See DOWNS, supra note 8, at 115-17 (borrowing from spatial competition theory
in economics to demonstrate the pull of the median voter).
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were built on correcting the errors of earlier, more liberal candidates.
Anticipating the need to field winnable candidates in November,
candidates will moderate their positions in the primary, and if the
party base values winning enough, activists will compromise their
principles. The tension between electoral and ideological
considerations is commonplace in political parties in all democracies,
but it does not prevent many parties from moving to median positions
when they so choose. Ironically, it could even be argued that if
blanket primary systems were perfectly successful, voters would have
less choice. Median voter logic would drive the candidates to nearly
identical spots in the center, reducing the selection to a difference in
labels, not policies.
In sum, there is no evidence that median voter incentives are weak
in the U.S. two-party system, nor that U.S. democracy is flawed
because one or both parties sometimes choose to offer noncentrist
candidates. There are cycles of polarization and moderation in U.S.
history, but there is no evidence that this is destructive to a
democracy. Arguably, we might even be better off with more distinct
ideological choices. The value of moderation is disputable, however,
and certainly cannot be equated with other broad democratic
principles such as equality, nondiscrimination, and protecting the
integrity and viability of the electoral system. At best, hypercentrism
gives normative value to an extreme version of Downsian theory,
which is no more democratic than many competing doctrines such as
the responsible party theory that Professor Hasen so harshly criticizes
in his counterpoint piece.2'
II. ASSOCIATIONAL HARMS AND PARTYAUTONOMY
Militating against the alleged state interests in furthering turnout
and the prospects of centrist candidates is the harm that was inflicted
upon California's parties and its two-party system when the blanket
primary rules were imposed by a majority vote in favor of Proposition
198 in 1996. I want to break this discussion into two parts: the
specific harms inflicted upon the parties by the blanket system and the
general harm against party autonomy and a two-party system.
Both the major and minor parties in California perceived the
blanket system as a threat to their capacity to carry out fundamental
part), functions, including fielding support and giving their party label
1, See Hasen, supra note 4, at 820-26 (criticizing responsible party government
scholars).
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to candidates running for elective offices. By definition, political
parties are teams of individuals who come together to coordinate
resources and efforts to elect individuals who will work on behalf of
common ideas and policies.2 What distinguishes political parties
from interest groups is that the former officially nominate candidates
under their name (i.e., party label) while the latter do not.
Additionally, in certain situations, the parties may receive state money
to run campaigns and hold conventions. Otherwise, parties and
interest groups can be very similar, especially in an era of
independent spending. It is widely acknowledged that interest groups
and other private political associations should have the unfettered
right to determine the governance of their internal affairs and the
beneficiaries of their support. Therefore, another way to frame the
party rights issue is to ask how much of the freedom normally
accorded to interest groups should be forfeited when a group places
its label next to a candidate's name on a ballot, and why. Arguing for
party autonomy, I would advocate only taking away what is necessary
to prevent racial discrimination and maintain the orderly
management of the ballot.
In Jones, the state would have required the parties to allow
independents (who had chosen not to affiliate with any party) and
other party registrants (who had chosen to affiliate with another
party) to participate in the selection of the parties' official nominees.!"'
The evidence at the trial and in subsequent studies is quite clear:
independents and registrants of other parties will take the opportunity
to cross over in greater numbers than in the closed primary system
that existed prior to Proposition 198.17 The reason for this is simple.
Although theoretically under a closed system, voters could re-register
in order to participate in another party's primary, the opportunity and
transaction costs of doing so are considerably higher. The voter
25 See MAURICE DUvERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND
AcnIvrrY IN THE MODERN STATE 364-66 (Barbara North & Robert North trans.,
Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1969) (1951) (discussing external sources of party development as
based on the need of the organization to develop electoral support and nominate
candidates).
26 See Cal. Democratic Party v.Jones, 120 S. CL 2402, 2409-10 (2000).
27 See R. Michael Alvarez & Jonathan Nagler, Should I Stay or Should I Go? Sincere
and Strategic Crossover Voting in California Assembly Races, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL
FAULT LINE, supra note 11 (manuscript at 161) (examining Assembly district crossover
voting); Thad Kousser, Crossing Over When It Counts: How the Motives of Voters in Blanket
Primaries Are Revealed in Their Actions in General Elections, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL
FAULT LINE, supra note 11 (manuscript at 213) (analyzing general election voting
behavior of primary crossover voters).
2001] PARTY A UTONOMY AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION 803
would actually have to go through the trouble of re-registering and
would forego the opportunity to participate in his own party's
primary. In most cases, voters would not care so much about one race
to pay such a high price.
There are several implications of the higher crossover vote for the
parties. First, under certain conditions, nonparty members can cast
the decisive vote and the party can be forced to give its official label to
a candidate that is not preferred by even a plurality of party
registrants!i8 Second, a significant number of the crossover voters will
be strategic, meaning they will not vote for their first preference but
for a candidate who serves other motives.
Studies of the 1998 California primary revealed two main types of
strategic voters: hedgers who had no competitive race in their own
primary and therefore voted for the most preferred candidate in
another party's primary (thereby ensuring that they at least get their
second favorite candidate in November), and raiders/saboteurs who
voted for the weakest candidate in order to help their own party's
candidate in the fall.2 9 While the number of raiders/saboteurs is small
and the total number of strategic voters will normally be less than the
total number of sincere crossover voters, it is clear that a party's
nomination in the spring may be determined by a significant number
of voters who will not support the nominee in November." This raises
serious questions about the authenticity and legitimacy of party
nominees made under a blanket system and about the system's
vulnerability to strategic manipulation.
The 2000 Michigan Republican primary illustrates the turmoil
that such problems can cause. 31 The Republicans adopted an open
- Several California counties kept count of crossover votes, and on that basis three
Republican candidates in the 2000 primary in Assembly districts 61, 62, and 72 alleged
that the), would have won had crossover been prohibited. One of them brought suit to
have the outcome reversed in light of the decision in Jones. The Court ruled against
the candidate. Righeimer v. Jones, No. CIV. S-00-1522DFLPAN, 2000 WL 1346808 at
*1 (Sept. 14, 2000) (rejecting the claims under the First Amendment and the
California Elections Code)."" These terms are discussed in Bruce E. Cain & Elisabeth R. Gerber, California's
Blanket Primary Experiment in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE, supra note 11
(manuscript at 1, 6-7). A summary of the findings can be found in the conclusion of
the book.
J" See Kousser, supra note 27, at 232-34 (summarizing findings of the effects of
crossover voting).
.11 See Bruce E. Cain & Megan Mullin, Strategies and Rules: Lessons from the 2000
Presidential Primarg, in G N & GERBER, supra note 11 (manuscript at 488, 500-06)
(examining the 2000 Michigan primary contest).
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primary rule while the Michigan Democrats opted for a caucus
procedure that took place on a different date. These conditions were
similar to a blanket primary in the sense that Democrats paid no
opportunity costs for voting in the Republican primary. As a result,
urged on by certain Democratic leaders, a significant number of
Democrats voted for John McCain in order to upset the Bush
nomination and to avenge Governor Engler's actions against the
Detroit schools. 32 The ensuing uproar raised serious questions about
the meaning and legitimacy of the election outcome.
Although Proposition 198 proponents often characterized the
conflict over the blanket rules as one between the party bosses and the
people, I think it should be apparent from the discussion to this point
that it is more accurate to say that it was a conflict between the
interests of the party as a nominating organization and the interests of
legislative or initiative majorities who wanted to dictate the processes
by which those organizations confer their party labels on candidates. I
reject Professor Hasen's position that control over the party label can
be easily separated from party endorsement and that therefore state
control over the nomination process is not forced association." As
decades of political science research amply demonstrates, the party
label has enormous informational value-indeed since a majority of
the electorate tends to vote predictably along the lines of party label,
it is the most important resource that the party possesses.! Giving up
control of that label is a significant blow to the party's capacity to
determine its nominees even if, as Professor Hasen notes, the party
can refuse to support those who eventually receive it.'-
But perhaps the most important question raised in the Jones
litigation is why parties should retain the right to confer party labels
on candidates. If the state can determine the time, manner, and place
of elections, then why should it not also dictate the process by which
party labels are assigned to candidates? My argument, which was first
32 See id. at 502-03 (noting that some Democrats voted for McCain to get even 1i.th
Governor Engler).
3 See Hasen, supra note 4, at 826-37 (discussing the effect of party labels).
34 Recent studies cast doubt on the thesis that voter partisanship is declining in
America. One shows that independents act more like party leaners. See BRUCE E.
KEITH ET AL., THE MITH OF THE INDEPENDENT VOTER (1992). Another scholar has
shown that partisan voting has rebounded in the nineties after a low in the seventies.
See Larry M. Bartels, Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996, 44 AM. J. POL. Sci. 35,
35-50 (2000) (analyzing the relationship between partisanship and voting behavior).
35 See Hasen, supra note 4, at 826-37 (noting that the party is not forced to
associate with, work for, or endorse the nominee).
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developed in work with my colleague Nate Persily, is that it is
functionally important in a free, democratic system for groups
undertaking party-like functions (that is, those that officially support
candidates under their party labels) to have the greatest possible
degree of self-determination and autonomy.' We reject, at one
extreme, the notion that the political parties should be mere
instruments of the state and, at the opposite extreme, that parties are
entirely private organizations. Rather, they should be quasi-
autonomous and, for the sake of a well-functioning two-party system,
the degree of state intrusion into party matters should be kept to a
minimum. Given the special history of racial discrimination, the
existence of constitutional amendments that protect against
intentional voting discrimination, and statutory protections against
institutions that effectively deny protected groups an equal
opportunity to participate, it is appropriate that the Court should
limit the parties' right to exclude voters from participation based on
race.
It is also appropriate for the state to set out a rational process by
which a reasonable number of candidates appear on the November
ballot. A primary system that restricts November ballot access to
primary ballot winners and write-ins limits the ballot to a manageable
number of candidates supported by groups that have received some
modicum of support in the past and to candidates who have garnered
more support than others from their own party. The majority in Jones
"considered it 'too plain for argument,' for example, that a State may
require parties to use the primary format for selecting their nominees,
in order to assure that intraparty competition is resolved in a
democratic fashion.0 7 I would add that expecting the parties to
participate in a primary while allowing the parties to require affiliation
if they so desire seems a reasonable compromise, given the large
participatory, gain that comes from having an election (as compared
to the very slight gain that comes from adopting the blanket system)
and the degree of autonomy the parties get from choosing the type of
primary system. But dictating the form of the primary rules goes
beyond the need to conduct an orderly and fair selection process.
The closed, blanket, open, and semi-open systems all serve that
" So, Persily & Cain, supra note 12, at 800 (stressing the centrality within our
stem of the "[plrinciple of [plarty [a]utonomy," which "serves as a filter for interest
group activity and under certain conditions can counteract the majoritarian bias of the
American plurality-based electoral system").
7 Cal. Democratic Party v.Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2404, 2407 (2000).
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function equally well. As I have argued at length already, the choice
of these procedures also affects the ideological content of the parties'
nominees and labels-for instance, the evidence that the blanket rules
might well have the effect of pushing candidates to the center-and
there is no compelling state interest in promoting certain ideologies
over others. 3
Aside from the requirements of nondiscrimination by race and of
a rationally winnowed ballot, the political parties should be allowed a
wide area of self-determination and autonomy. As I am not a legal
scholar, I will not presume to enter into a discussion of whether the
majority's decision in Jones is faithful to the precedents in Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Connecticu?9 and Eu v. San Francisco County
Democratic Central Committee.° What I can add, however, is a theoretical
justification for the position that the Court has taken on party rights.
Nate Persily and I have called this a "functional" theory of party rights.
The theory starts from the premise that even though parties are
not mentioned in the federal Constitution, their existence is logically
implied in the electoral rules established by the states. Congressional
elections, for example, are fought under single-member, simple
plurality rules. That means that there can be only one winner per
district, and the largest vote-getter gets the seat. Under these
conditions, there is a tendency for the system to consolidate into two
main teams or parties and for most potential supporters of minor
parties to cast their votes for major party candidates in order to avoid
wasting those votes.
As mentioned earlier, there are also strong centripetal forces
operating on those parties, driving them towards the median voter."
Political parties are part of the informal constitution-institutions that
fill in the implied functions that arise out of the formal electoral
structure. Political parties are no accident. They derive from the
8 See supra text accompanying note 20.
Z9 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
40 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
41 For evidence of sophisticated voting in national elections, see Paul R. Abramson
et al., Sophisticated Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 55
(1992), describing the 1988 presidential election as "an excellent opportunity to test
for the presence of sophisticated voting." The most extensive analysis of the role of
strategic voting and the number of parties can be found in GARY W. COX, MAKING
VOTES COUNT: STRATEGIC COORDINATION IN THE WORLD'S ELECTORAL SISTEMs
(1997).
42 See DOWNS, supra note 8, at 36-50 (exploring the causes and rationales of voting
behavior).
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need to organize efforts to solicit voter support for candidates and to
coordinate legislative action around a common program. They exist
in a no-man's land between the public and private sectors: the party
as government (for example, elected officials) in the former and the
party as organization (such as activists and party officials) in the latter.
Leaving aside a rights-based argument that the party as organization
deserves autonomy because citizen participation is protected by the
First Amendment and freedom of association, I want to suggest that
giving the party as organization the broadest degree of autonomy is
functionally important for several reasons.
First, it protects against dominant party abuse. Dominant party
abuse commonly occurs when one party controls the governorship
and state legislature and uses that legislative control to pass measures
that confer on it political advantage. The best example of this is, of
course, the partisan gerrymandering that occurs when the party
controlling the redistricting process draws the lines so as to get a
better chance to win extra seats in the next election. Dominant party
abuse can also take other forms, such as when one party tries to
prevent another party from adopting the nomination process most
beneficial to the other party. This is arguably what the Tashjian case
was about: the dominant party trying to prevent the other party from
opening its nomination process to independents to gain electoral
advantage. There are those who would try to define fairness formally
and have the Court rule against decisions such as redistricting plans
that smack of partisan bias.' Others believe that it is impossible to
develop unbiased standards of political fairness and have opted for
bipartisan procedural approaches to remedy the situations where
partisan abuse seems most likely.4
In the case of party rules, since there is no compelling reason for
state action in the heightened participation and centrism arguments,
or even for the parties to have the same rules, the best check against
partisan abuse as I have defined it is to let each party determine its
own partisan rules. By comparison, in the case of redistricting, since
5 See, 11.g., Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting. A Social Science Perspective, 33
UCLA L. REv. 88-93 (1985) (reflecting on formal districting criteria). For an approach
based more on compactness, see Richard Niemi et al., Measuring Compactness and the
Rob, of a Compactmss Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Genymandering, 52J. POL.
1155, 1157 (1990) (presenting "the first comprehensive study of compactness
measures").
11 S, BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 159-66 (1984) (discussing
some of the advantages of bipartisan gerrymandering and rules by which it might be
implemented).
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one cannot draw separate lines for each of the political parties for the
obvious practical reason, and since there are no coherent,
indisputable standards for determining fair lines, I have argued for
political reforms that establish supermajority rules for legislative
redistricting decisions. Since the greatest dangers in a two-party
system are the possible collapse into a one-party system (e.g.,
Southern politics from 1948 to 1964) and the general loss of a second
viable choice across the board (e.g., strong incumbency effects),
autonomy from other party control assures that rules and procedures
are set in the best interests of party members, and not in the interests
of their opposition.
A second argument for party autonomy, which I would call
protection from majority abuse, is more relevant to the facts in Jones
than in Tashjian. My first reason related to the abuse of power along
party lines; this second discusses abuse that transcends party lines. It
should be assumed in any discussion that people all along the
ideological spectrum would prefer to have their views predominate. If
the two parties drift in a more polarized direction, those in the middle
will be unhappy with what we in political science quaintly call the
"summed Euclidian loss of utility"--the distance of the party actions
from the median voter ideal . If the parties drift toward the center,
voters on the ends become alienated, threatening to abstain or vote
for a minor party because of their "Euclidian loss." The history of
party nomination processes is that the parties tinker with rules in
response to their varying inclinations either to please the base or to
entice more independent and crossover voters into their ranks. In
this framework, we can recharacterize the facts in Jones as a centrist
majority (independents and moderate partisans) fixing the rules to
give themselves an advantage over a much smaller minority of
ideologues in the selection of candidates.46 Even the minor parties
45 This spatial model theory is described in William H. Riker & Peter C.
Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 25, 34 (1968)
(offering "a theory about the individual calculus of voting which is ... consistent %'ith
some known facts about the decision to vote"), and in Richard D. McKelvey & Peter C.
Ordeshook, A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting, in MATHEMATICAL APPLICATIONS
IN PoLICAL SCIENCE VI, at 32 (James F. Herndon & Joseph L. Bernd eds., 1972)
(applying the calculus of voting "to permit inferences about participation in
multicandidate elections").
46 It should be noted that that according to a comprehensive poll of the California
electorate released on August 10, 2000, by the Public Policy Institute of California, only
11% of likely voters describe themselves as very liberal and 10% as very conservative,
the rest saying they are moderate or only somewhat liberal or conservative. In short,
true ideologues probably account for no more than 1/5 of the California population.
20011 PARTY A LTONOMYAAD ELECTORAL COMPETITION 809
were swept into adopting the centrist majority's favored procedures,
which Professor Hasen concedes is particularly threatening to their
role as innovators and spokespersons for conscience and principle. 7
Even though the U.S. two-party system already has strong centripetal
forces and fields relatively non-ideological and centrist candidates as
compared to European democracies, the blanket primary supporters
sought to eliminate the last element of "Euclidian loss" with a
procedural coup d'etat. This is no less an abuse of power than the
partisan case.
Aside from these two protective functions, party autonomy has
other roles. One is that it facilitates the coalition-building process for
broadly based parties. Since the logic of winner-take-all election
systems works against factions striking out on their own and fielding a
separate slate of candidates, groups have incentives to make
compromises in order to build alliances. The product of those
compromises can move the party away from the median voter ideal,
but the extent of this movement constantly varies with the political
context and recent electoral experiences. The flexibility to move away
from an electorally dominant position is important to keeping
coalition partners under the big tent. It may be necessary for a party
to go through a cycle of loss until new terms of compromise are
offered by the groups that feel most intensely about a given issue
position.
Hence, for example, it took the Democrats several disappointing
elections in the eighties to abandon their unpopular position on the
death penalty. Liberals made the conscious choice in the nineties to
support Clinton and Gore. Had the rules been rigged in the eighties
by Proposition 198 supporters, the base would have been spared the
experience of learning the painful electoral lesson, but the basis for
compromise and willing alliance would have been undercut as well.
Since this is a counterfactual argument, I can only speculate as to the
consequences, but it at least seems plausible that noncentrists could
be alienated in larger numbers if they do not feel that their views are
at least occasionally represented and tested by the parties' candidates.
Having autonomy in these matters gives parties the freedom to
compromise between ideological purity and electoral opportunity in
whatever ways they think best. Imposing rules that tilt the nomination
and the rest think of themselves as moderate or somewhat liberal or conservative.
MLARK BLDA.SSARE, PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY: CL.FORNIANS AND THEIR GOvERNMENT
3n (2000).
7 Soi, Hasen, supra note 4, at 837-41.
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towards the median voter undercuts the need for negotiation and
compromise.
Finally, there is the ultimate irony of two-party systems with
enhanced median voter incentives; namely, that in equilibrium, they
converge to the same point. The reason is quite simple: the median
voter position is dominant and no position to the left or right can
defeat it. It therefore produces a virtual version of the noncom-
petitive danger I referred to earlier. A two-party system becomes
noncompetitive when it produces only one viable choice for extended
periods of time and at various levels of the system. A virtually
noncompetitive system is one in which both choices are effectively the
same choice; in which technically there is a choice between two labels,
but substantively there is little or no difference between them. For
those at or near the median position, this describes a political nirvana,
with little risk of the dreaded "Euclidian loss." But for all others, the
already limited representational coverage of the two-party system
becomes more limited. Giving parties autonomy saves the two-party
system from becoming a meaningless exercise in labeling, and further
prevents a descent into personality and character assassination politics
(because that is all that is left to argue about). It is extremely ironic
that many of the scholars who most strongly advocate that the Court
should intervene to promote competition and choice now argue that
the Court should stand back and allow a centrist electoral majority to
cripple the two parties' ability to offer even two choices."
III. To INTERVENE OR NOT?
So far, I have argued that the state had no compelling reason to
impose blanket nomination rules upon California's political parties.
Moreover, political parties should be given the greatest degree of self-
determination in these matters, because it is functionally important
for four reasons: protection against majority party abuse, protection
against majority abuse, flexibility to create coalitions, and the
See Issacharoff, supra note 4 (acknowledging that party positions are a product
of median voter and activist pressure, but seeming to place less value than I do on the
role that activists play in preventing near or complete party convergence to the
median). Issacharoff explains that the core of his anti-lockup theory is that "there
should be legal intervention when self-serving incumbent behavior threatens the
competitiveness of the process." Id. (manuscript at 8). Apparently, when self-serving
factions combine to lock up the field for centrist candidates and weaken the ability of
the parties to incorporate the minority opinions of those on the ends of the ideological
continuum, his theory has nothing to say.
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prevention of convergence. Given the positions that I have taken in
the past about the value of political self-correction, the losses
associated with the abandonment of the political question doctrine,
and the drawbacks of court-imposed institutional values, 4' how do I
reconcile my support for the Court's decision in this matter with my
preference for political self-correction?
A neglected aspect of Jones is that the blanket primary reform
became a state action through the popular initiative. Encouraged by
the failure of state courts to enforce the distinction between
fundamental revision and mere amendment, and seeing the
advantages of bypassing elected officials, the initiative is no longer the
tool of last resort-direct democracy has become the preferred
method of political reform in states like California with few subject
matter restrictions, a highly professional initiative industry, and
relatively easy requirements for placing measures on the ballot. The
constituency that controls the outcome of votes on initiative measures
is the set of statewide registered voters. The success and failure of
these measures reflect the median voter preferences of that group.
The state legislature, on the other hand, elects representatives who
compete in districts based on population and not voters. Moreover,
the districts are not likely to be perfectly random samples of the
statewide electorate. Add in the effects of interest group lobbying,
party leadership, and other nonelectoral factors, and it is not hard to
see how the same measures might be treated differently in the
legislature than in the initiative process. For the purposes of political
debate, this tends to get subsumed under the generalization that
politicians are sometimes insulated from the popular will (i.e.,
statewide median preference). The important point is that for all of
the above reasons, we can expect political reform to continue to
emanate from the initiative process.
Leaving aside the merits of this development, majorities will
sometimes make institutional choices that truly address undemocratic
features, such as the need for full disclosure, the prevention of
corruption, and the need for weaker incumbency effects. In other
instances, however, the majority may try to strengthen its control,
weaken the rights of those in the minority, or override procedural
justice. This leaves the court system as the sole guardian against
majority tyranny and injustice. As the number of initiatives has grown,
J, S e Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist's Perspective, 32 LOy.
L. REv. 1105, 1111 (1999) (discussing the value of judicial intervention in political
issues).
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so have the number of instances in which the courts have had to
invalidate all or parts of measures that violate constitutional rights. "
While there are a number of checks and balances in addition to the
courts for the normal legislative process in the United States, there is
nothing other than the courts in the case of initiatives. While I worry
about the difficult position this puts the courts in-especially the state
courts-I see no alternative. We may want to re-think the wisdom of
allowing direct election of justices in states where direct democracy
mechanisms thrive, or attempt to reform the initiative process to make
it a more deliberative process. In the short run, the courts cannot
retreat from the challenge of reviewing initiative measures with even
more scrutiny than they give legislative measures.51
In the case of the blanket primary, the interests of minor parties
and of ideological minorities within the major parties rightfully
52deserved consideration. It is safe to assume that voting majorities
will sometimes be tempted to trample on the rights and interests of
others. Balancing the interests of the minority against the will of the
majority is the unpopular part, quite literally, of the Madisonian
equation. Hence, it is no surprise that a recent poll of Californians
revealed that a majority of them did not like the Court's ruling in
Jones. 3 However, as I have argued before, this case is about more than
50 See Kenneth P. Miller, The Role of the Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search
For Standards, Paper Delivered at the American Political Science Association (1999).
MI See Hans A. Linde, Practicing Theory: The Forgotten Law of Initiative Lawmaking, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1735, 1752 (1998) ("Majorities in the representative legislature have
considered, shaped, and approved referred measures; [in an initiative,J the voters'
only role is to give or withhold their consent.").
2 Again, it is curious to political scientists that legal scholars who are illing to
give special protections to minor parties will not extend the same protection to minor
voices within the major parties. The problem may be that they assume the parties to
be monolithic rather than aggregations of different groups and factions. When the
parties are conceived as aggregations, it is then possible to see how factions of the
parties, along with the independents, might combine in an initiative vote to put in
place rules that favor their interests. In this sense, the minor voices within the majority
parties are vulnerable to majority attempts to fix the rules to favor centrist candidates.
1 See BALDASSARE, supra note 46, at 12 ("Most Californians are not pleased that
the Supreme Court has ruled unconstitutional California's blanket/open
primary .... "). The poll by the Public Policy Institute of California informed
respondents that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the blanket primary on the
grounds that it violated the political parties' right of association, and then explained
that this meant voters would only be able to vote in the primary of their registered
party. When asked their opinion, 64% had an unfavorable opinion of the Supreme
Court's decision and 28% had a favorable view. At the same time, when asked to look
back on the effect of the blanket primary in 1998 on California elections, 45% said that
the blanket primary had no effect, 22% said that it was a good thing, and another 22%
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the rights of the parties generally, minor parties specifically, or
noncentrists per se. It is also about using the state to predispose
election outcomes to fall into a certain segment of the ideological
spectrum and undermining the operation of the two-party system.
This goes to the question of the neutrality of state action with respect
to the content of political speech and representation.
Many of the most important institutional decisions have political
implications. The decision to use winner-take-all rules as opposed to
proportional or semiproportional rules gives advantages to some
groups and not others. Unless the rules arrive from heaven on a stone
tablet in the offices of some wise political science professor, their
selection can be viewed as arbitrarily favoring some over others. If the
state is to run an orderly election, however, it has to have some
procedure. As long as the eventual winner receives majority or at least
plurality support from a free electorate, the process will be
democratic. There are well-known trade-offs implicit in choosing one
system over another, and all systems, including proportional ones,
have to cut off representation somewhere. The argument over which
system is best is a non-terminating disagreement. Still, a choice has to
be made for the state to function.
In the case of the blanket primary, the state had no overriding
reason to impose a choice. To the contrary, there were at least four
good reasons why they should have left the matter to the parties. My
strongest objections to past court intervention in political reform
disputes have been reserved for cases in which I felt the court locked
in a particular theory of representation or institutional design, leaving
the political system without the flexibility to adapt to different needs
and circumstances. Hence, the extension of the rigid one person-one
vote mandate beyond Congress to all elected local governments has
made it difficult to create new cooperative regional arrangements by
ruling out mechanisms that alleviate the fears of uncooperative
smallerjurisdictions that they will be swallowed up by larger ones.54 In
Jones, the state was attempting to implement an initiative measure that
would have locked in a theory of representational hypercentrism
rather than allowing the parties to go through the natural cycles of
said that it was a bad thing. Id. In short, the public does not regard this issue as
making a critical difference to them.
51 So', Cain, supra note 49, at 1110 ("Since... smaller cities were unwilling to join
into any arrangement that would allow their suburban votes to be swramped by the
more numerous votes of the larger, urban cities, the governance problem proved to be
insurmountable.").
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moderation and polarization. The neutral action was to keep control
of the decision in the hands of the parties.
Most states have not opted for the closed primary system. In the
2000 Presidential primaries, for instance, only fourteen states used the
closed primary system and twenty-seven Republican and twenty-two
Democratic state parties adopted either open or semi-open systems. 7
The trend has been towards fully open rules, but based on the
experiences of the Republican Michigan primary, we may see more
movement towards semi-open systems in the next election cycle. The
critical point is that letting the parties choose does not lock in any
particular method as did Proposition 198.
CONCLUSION
Professor Hasen poses the question as "who controls the electoral
process, major party organizations or the people[?] ' '56 He proclaims
his vote is with the people, although he wavers on the question of the
minor parties. It should be clear from my discussion that I see this
issue in entirely different terms. First, the term "the people" is his
euphemism for electoral majority. Second, he provides no
compelling explanation for why the majority needs to add to the
already strong centripetal features of the U.S. political system, nor why
independents so anxious to participate cannot register in the party
they want to affect. There are no barriers to their participation other
than their own decisions to declare themselves unaffiliated. Is there a
compelling interest in helping them have their cake and eat it too?
Professor Hasen's concern for minor parties and alternative
voices, for some reason, does not extend to minorities within parties
such as hard-core liberals and conservatives. Using the initiative, the
majority will increasingly shape the rules to consolidate its power.
Forgotten are the Madisonian lessons of balancing the rights of the
minority and the majority. Apparently, some would have the Court
lock in a preference for plebiscitary democracy. I do not wish to be
counted among them.
55A curious feature is that open systems are not necessarily more fair in their
allocation of delegates. A lot depends on whether the state uses proportional
representation or nonproportional representation rules. Even odder is the fact that
on some measures, such as estimated responsiveness, caucuses fare better than
primaries. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Gary King, Measuring the Consequences of Delegate
Selection Rules in Presidential Nominations, 52 J. POL. 609, 616 (1990) (describing the
effect of voting rules on electoral responsiveness in primaries and caucuses).
56 See Hasen, supra note 4, at 817.
